Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in web services, service-oriented architectures and grid computing, as well as applications of these technologies e.g. for e-science (science that is enabled by the use of distributed computing resources by end-user scientists) and e-business [12] , [22] , [23] . Security is a fundamental issue for these emerging technologies and applications, due to their open, highly distributed and large scale nature and their need to share services and resources and allow mutual access to them.
In this paper, we propose a trust and agent-based approach to render these systems secure. The idea is to establish a framework allowing entities (web services, virtual organizations, etc.) to evaluate how much trust they have in one another. These entities are abstracted as autonomous agents able to interact with one another by communicating. Inter-agent communication is regulated by protocols (shared amongst agents and thus public) and determined by strategies (internal to agents and thus private). The paper addresses the following questions: 1) What information can agents use when evaluating the trust they have in other agents? 2) Which protocols and strategies can agents use to support this trust evaluation? 3) How can trust be propagated through the system? Centralized approaches to security fail to adequately address the e-computing challenges posed by open systems. They are mostly based upon mechanisms such as digital certificates, and thus are particularly vulnerable to "attacks". This is because if some authorities who are implicitly trusted are compromised, then there is no other check available in the system. Instead, in the decentralized approach we propose in this paper, any "intruders" may only cause limited harm before being detected. Indeed, in our approach, agents trust other agents for more reasons than a single certificate, as they interact and reason about trust values using their internal reasoning.
Recently, some decentralized trust models have been proposed (see [19] for a survey). However, these models are purely quantitative and consider agents just as objects interacting by message exchange, without reasoning capabilities.
However, in multi-agent systems, agents reason using their knowledge bases before making decisions, and can thus engage in flexible interactions. In addition, some of these existing models do not consider the case where false information is collected. This paper aims at overcoming these limitations. Some agent-based approaches to security exist in the literature, notably the one proposed in [22] , but these focus on authentication and authorization issues whereas we focus on trust evaluation and propagation through a social network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the theoretical background, in particular introducing the notions of communication protocol and strategies and sketching the reasoning capabilities of agents. In Section III, we introduce the notion of direct trust and show how agents' direct experiences are used to compute this. Section IV focuses on the propagation of trust through a social network. The algorithmic description and computational complexity of such a propagation are stressed. In Section V, we describe and discuss implementation issues. In Section VI, we compare our framework to related work. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Through this paper, we consider agent-based systems as societies of autonomous interacting agents. These agents could represent different entities depending on the application: web services, virtual organizations, etc. Agents interact with each other using advanced communication techniques based on dialogue game protocols [9] , [15] , [17] . Dialogue games are interactions between players (agents), in which each player moves by performing utterances according to a pre-defined set of rules. Let us define these notions of protocol and dialogue games.
Definition 1 (Protocol):
A protocol P r is a pair C, D with C a finite set of allowed communicative acts and D a set of dialogue games.
We will assume that communicative acts in C may be of c different types (c > 0) and we will denote by CA i (Ag 1 , Ag 2 , p, t) a communicative act of type i performed by some agent Ag 1 and addressed to some other agent Ag 2 at time t about content p. Inform(Mary, John, Malicious(Bob), 10) is an example of a communicative act (of type Inform) by which Mary informs John at time 10 that she believes that a certain agent Bob is malicious.
Intuitively, a dialogue game in D is a rule indicating the possible communicative acts an agent could perform when he receives a communicative act from some other agent. This is specified formally as follows:
Definition 2 (Dialogue Game): A dialogue game Dg is either of the form:
where CA i , CA j are in C, t < t j and n i is the number of allowed communicative acts Ag 2 could perform after receiving a communicative act of type i from Ag 1 ; or of the form
where CA j are in C, t 0 is some initial time, and n is the number of allowed communicative acts Ag 1 could perform initially.
According to the definition of dialogue game, a dialogue game is in general non-deterministic, in that, for example, given an incoming communicative act of type i, the receiving agent needs to choose amongst n i possible replies. In order to render agents deterministic, we introduce the conditions within dialogue games, each associated with a single reply.
Definition 3 (Dialogue Game with Conditions):
A dialogue game with conditions DgC is a conjunction of rules, specified either as follows:
where t < t j and n i is the number of allowed communicative acts Ag 2 could perform after receiving a communicative act of type i from Ag 1 ; or specified as follows:
where t 0 is the initial time and n is the number of allowed communicative acts Ag 1 could perform initially.
In order to guarantee determinism, the conditions C j need to be mutually exclusive [21] . Dialogue games with conditions reflect agents' private strategies. How conditions C j are represented and evaluated is private to each agent. For example, agents may use argumentation to evaluate these conditions [4] , [7] and the reasoning capabilities of agents are defined using argumentation. Argumentation can be abstractly defined as a dialectical process for the interaction of different arguments for and against some conclusion [10] , [8] , [3] . For example, an argument may be defined as a deduction from a given set of rules of a conclusion, or as a pair (H, h) where h is a sentence in some given language and H a subset of a given knowledge base such that (i) H logically entails h, (ii) H is consistent and (iii) there is no subset of H with properties (i) and (ii).
Because there may be conflicts between arguments, we need to define what an acceptable argument is. The following is a possible definition (corresponding to the definition of "admissible" set of arguments in [10] ):
Arg, AT be an abstract argumentation framework. A set S ⊆ Arg of arguments is said acceptable iff:
In other words, a set of arguments is acceptable iff it does not contain any conflicts and it can counter-attack every attack. Then, a single argument may be deemed acceptable, e.g., if it belongs to some acceptable set of arguments or to all maximally acceptable set of arguments [11] .
Argumentation is especially useful when only incomplete and/or inconsistent information is available. This is typically the case for our agents, that inhabit an open and dynamic society. Agents can use argumentation to evaluate the conditions in their strategies and thus decide how to react to incoming communicative acts. In particular, each condition C j can be seen as an argument from the agent's argumentation system supporting the communicative act to be performed.
The idea here is that agents use their reasoning argumentation abilities in order to decide about the next communicative act to perform [6] , [18] . For example, if an agent Mary informs an agent John that a proposition P is true, John may accept the proposition if he can build an acceptable argument for P from his knowledge base, he may refuse P if he can build an argument for ¬P and may otherwise challenge P .
III. DIRECT TRUST
We adopt a probabilistic-based approach to compute trust values [5] . We define an agent's trust in other agents as a probability function as follows: To simplify the notation, in the remainder we will omit the domain from all the formulas. Given agents Ag a and Ag b in A, we will represent T r(Ag a , Ag b ) in short as T r
Ag b
Aga . In this section we consider the case where agents in the system know each other because they had a prior interaction history and can thus compute the trust value of all agents (and thus the T r function) directly. We will assume that agents are equipped with means to evaluate the outcomes of their interactions, e.g. again using an argumentation system. Let us assume that they can evaluate their interactions as "good" or "bad". A good interaction could be one after which the agent is satisfied because his goal that prompted the interaction is achieved after the interaction (successful outcome). A bad interaction could be the opposite (unsuccessful outcome). The trust value given by T r can be assessed as the ratio of the "number of successful outcomes" to the "total number of possible outcomes". Formally, let NG Aga be the total number of interactions between Ag a and Ag b . We can define:
Because agents are equipped with sophisticated reasoning capabilities, they could evaluate the outcomes of their interactions using more flexible values such as "very good", "good", "fair", "bad", and "very bad". In the general case, they could evaluate their interactions according to a scale of n types numbered from 1 (the most successful interaction) to n (the less successful interaction), such that the first m interaction types (m < n) are successful (for example of type "very good", "good", and "fair"). Let 
where w i is the weight associated to the interaction type i.
Agents could use several strategies when weighting the interaction types. For example, to minimize the risk of dealing with untrustworthy agents, the weight of "very bad" interactions could be higher than the one of "very good" interactions. This means that unsuccessful interactions are more valuable when assessing the agents' trust, and agents should perform well and avoid bad behavior in order to get a better trust value. However, less demanding agents could give the same weight to all interaction types, or give more weight to the "very good" and "good" interactions.
IV. INDIRECT TRUST
Agents can evaluate directly the trust value of agents they have interacted with extensively. However, if the number of interactions with some agent is low (e.g. because the agents has only recently joined the system), agents are not able to compute their trust value directly, but may need to rely upon information provided to them by other agents (that may have interacted more extensively with the given agent). As proposed in [1] , [24] , [25] , we will assume that each agent has two kinds of beliefs when evaluating the trust of another agent: local beliefs and total beliefs. Local beliefs are based on the direct interactions among agents. Total beliefs are based on the combination of the different testimonies of other agents that we call witnesses. In our model, local beliefs are given by Equation 2. Total beliefs require studying how different probability measures offered by witnesses can be combined. We deal with this aspect below, by considering two mechanisms, each associated with its own protocols, strategies, and computation of the T r function. The protocols and strategies allow agents to gather information about an unknown, or not well known, agent from witnesses. They differ as to whether these witnesses are directly known to and trusted by the requesting agents or not.
A. Protocol 1: Trustworthy Agents
Let us suppose that agent Ag a wants to evaluate the trust of an unknown, or not well known, agent Ag b . Ag a then asks agents he knows to be trustworthy in judging other agents and Ag b in particular. We will denote these trustworthy agents (the witnesses) as Ag i (i = 1 . . . k). Before asking a witness Ag i about the trustworthiness of the third party Ag b , Ag a should check that there is no conflict (of interest of other type) between Ag i and Ag b . This is represented by the following strategy:
where
considers trustworthy, and Req Inf(Ag a , Ag i , T rust(Ag b ), t 0 ) is the communicative act by means of which initially Ag a sends to Ag i a request for information related to Ag b 's trust. The form of this information and the decision as to whether an agent is to be deemed trustworthy will be discussed later.
When Ag i receives the Req Inf communicative act, he uses the following dialogue game (protocol) to reply: 
is called Trustworthy Agents Protocol and is illustrated by Fig. 1 . Here, we adopt a graphical representation of protocols, by means of finite state automata, where communicative acts performed initially label edges from double circles, the reply to communicative acts labelling incoming edges into single circles label outgoing edges from these circles, and no reply is foreseen by the protocol to communicative acts labelling incoming arcs into thick single circles.
How to select one of the communicative acts allowed in S 1 is based on the argumentative reasoning capabilities of Ag i , as discussed in Section II. Each of these three choices is associated with a condition C Req Infj (j = 1 . . . 3) in the strategy below:
These conditions could be defined as follows: also gives additional information, as we will discuss later).
B. Trust Evaluation in Protocol 1
Ag a attributes a trust measure T r
Agi
Aga to each of the agents Ag i (i = 1 . . . k) he considers trustworthy. In general, when an (evaluator) agent assesses the trustworthiness of another (evaluated) agent, the former may consider the latter either trustworthy or untrustworthy depending on the trust measure he assigns to this evaluated agent and some threshold fixed by the evaluator. The trust measure can be computed using Equation 2. We will define Ag i trustworthy by Ag a when the trust measure T r Agi Aga , given by Equation 2, is greater than a threshold α a fixed by Ag a .
We assume that trustworthy agents Ag i (i = 1 . . . k , k ≤ k) also use Equation 2 to assess the trust value of the agents they know, and in particular Ag b . Thus, the problem consists in Ag a evaluating Ag b 's trust measure combining the trust values transmitted by trustworthy agents to Ag a . Once this value is computed, Ag a decides to consider Ag b trustworthy or not depending again on the threshold α a . In the remainder, for simplicity we will assume that k = k.
Overall, this is a probabilistic problem, and to solve it, we should investigate the distribution of the probabilistic variable X representing the trustworthiness of Ag b . Because, as we discussed earlier, X may take only one of the two values: 0 (the agent is not trustworthy) or 1 (otherwise), the variable X follows a Bernoulli distribution β (1, p) . Consequently: E(X) = p where E(X) is the expectation of the variable X and p is the probability that the agent is trustworthy. Here, p is the probability we need to compute and it is enough to evaluate the expectation E(X) to find T r
Ag b
Aga . However, this expectation is a theoretical mean that we must estimate. To this end, we can use the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) and the law of large numbers. The CLT states that whenever a sample of size s (X 1 , . . . , X s ) is taken from any distribution with mean μ, then the sample mean (X 1 + · · · + X s )/n will be approximately normally distributed with mean μ. As an application of this theorem, the arithmetic mean (average) (X 1 +· · ·+X s )/s approaches a normal distribution of mean μ, the expectation and standard deviation σ/ √ s. Generally, and according to the law of large numbers, the expectation can be estimated by the weighted arithmetic mean.
Our probabilistic variable X is the weighted average of k independent variables X i that correspond to Ag b 's trust according to the point of view of trustworthy agents Ag i . These variables follow the same Bernoulli distribution. They are also independent because in the general case, the probability that Ag b is trustworthy according to an agent Ag t is independent of the probability that this agent (Ag b ) is trustworthy according to another agent Ag r (even though sometimes the two agents Ag t and Ag r can have the same opinion about Ag b 's trust because considering the same sequence of events, these events are still independent in the general case). Consequently, the variable X could be approximated by a normal distribution whose average is the weighted average of the expectations of the independent variables X i . The estimation of expectation E(X) can be given by the following equation:
The value M 0 represents a first estimation of T r
Aga . This estimation, however, does not take into account the number of interactions between the trustworthy agents and Ag b . This number is an important factor because it allows promoting information coming from agents that are more knowledgeable about Ag b . Another factor might be used to reflect the timely relevance of transmitted information. This is because the agent's environment is dynamic and may change quickly. The idea is to promote recent information and to deal with out-ofdate information with less emphasis.
The timely relevance could be represented as a coefficient when computing the agent's trust. We use the following function to estimate this factor:
The parameter Δt is the time difference between the current time and the time at which Ag i updates his information about
Agi ) is the number of interactions between Ag i and Ag b during the time difference Δt. λ is an application-dependent coefficient. The intuition behind this formula is to use a function decreasing with the time difference. Consequently, the more recent the information, the higher is the timely relevance coefficient. The logarithm function is used for computational reasons when dealing with large numbers. Intuitively, this function, which is similar to the well known reliability function for systems engineering (R(t) = e −λt ), reflects the reliability of the transmitted information.
The number of interactions during Δt (N (Δt
Agi )) is an important trust parameter, because in order to get accurate information, it is not only important to evaluate how recent the information is, but also how much recent information the agents use. Indeed, a trust function should consider not only the total number of interactions, but also the number of recent interactions. Fig. 2 .
illustrates the behavior of the function T R(Δt

Ag b
Agi ) depending on the number of interactions when λ = −0.5. by Ag i to Ag a following the strategies previously indicated.
T r
Ag b 
C. Protocol 2: Social Network
In the previous section, we developed a Trustworthy Agents Protocol and Strategy that allows agents (Ag a ) to ask others (Ag i ) information about the trust value of a third party (Ag b ). If these agents themselves do not have information about Ag b , they reply by performing the communicative act T r NotHave. In this section, we render the earlier mechanism more sophisticate by allowing trustworthy agents to provide additional agents serving as referees who may know the third party. These referees could also suggest other referees in turn if they do not know this third party either. As for the Trustworthy Agent Protocol, Ag a may use his argumentation system to select one of the two choices specified in DG1. Each choice is associated with a strategy (C T r NotHavej (j ∈ {1, 2})). An example of these conditions are:
Informally, if Ag a has received enough relevant information about Ag b 's trust, he will not ask for any more referees, otherwise, he will. The three conditions for the strategy associated to DG2 may be identical to the ones associated to the dialogue game of the Trustworthy Agent Protocol.
D. Trust Evaluation in Protocol 2
Ag a should assess the trust value for each referee using the relevant information transmitted by the trustworthy agents or by other referees. This is done by applying Equation 5 , in which Ag b represents now the referee rather than the third party and Ag i represent the agents who refer this referee. The new computed values will be used to evaluate the third party's trust. We can build a trust graph in order to deal with this issue. We define such a graph as follows: According to this definition, in order to determine the trust of the target agent Ag b , it is necessary to find the weight of the node representing this agent in the graph. The graph is constructed while Ag a receives answers from the consulted agents. The evaluation process of the nodes starts when the entire graph is built. This means that this process only starts when Ag a has received all the answers from the consulted agents. The process terminates when the node representing Ag b is evaluated. The termination is guaranteed since the number of consulted agents is finite.
The graph construction algorithm is as follows: 3) When a consulted agent answers by indicating a set of agents, these agents will also be consulted. They can be regarded as potential witnesses. These witnesses are added to a set called: P otential W itnesses. When a potential witness is consulted, he is removed from the set. 4) To ensure that the evaluation process terminates, two limits are used: the maximum number of agents to be consulted (Limit Nbr V isited Agents) and the maximum number of witnesses who must offer an answer (Limit Nbr W itnesses).
The trust combination formula (Equation 5
) is used to evaluate the graph nodes. The weight of each node indicates the trust value of the agent represented by the node. Such a weight is assessed using the weights of the adjacent nodes. For example, let Arc(Ag x , Ag y ) be an arc in the graph, Ag x should be evaluated before evaluating Ag y . Consequently, the evaluation algorithm is recursive. This algorithm terminates because the nodes of the set T rustworthy(Ag a ) are already evaluated by the construction graph algorithm. Since the evaluation is done recursively, the call of this algorithm in the main program has as parameter the agent Ag b . This algorithm is specified in Algorithm 1.
Complexity
Our trust model is based on the construction of a trust graph and on a recursive call to the function Evaluate-Node(Ag y ) to assess the weight of all the nodes. Since each node is visited exactly once, there are n recursive calls, where n is the number of nodes in the graph. To assess the weight of a node we need the weights of its neighboring nodes and the weights of the input edges. Thus, the algorithm takes a time in O(n) for the recursive calls and a time in O(e) to assess the agents' trust where e is the number of edges. The run time of the trust algorithm is therefore in O(max(e, n)) i.e. linear in the size of the graph.
Algorithm 1: Node Evaluation
A. Prototype
We have implemented a prototype allowing agents to communicate using the protocols and strategies given in this paper, reason using argumentation, and evaluate trust using the mechanisms we have provided above. The prototype is designed as a society of interacting agents equipped with knowledge bases and argumentation systems. It is implemented using the Jack c T M platform (The Agent-Oriented Software Group, 2004). Agents' knowledge bases contain propositional formulae (under the form of Horn clauses) and arguments. These knowledge bases are designed and implemented as Jack c T M data structures called belief sets, which are used to maintain an agent's beliefs about the world. The meaning of the propositional formulae (i.e. the ontology) is recorded in a belief set whose access is shared among the agents. Agent communication is done by sending and receiving messages, which are events extending the basic Jack c T M M essageEvent class. Dialogue games are implemented as a set of events and plans. A plan describes a sequence of actions that an agent can perform when an event occurs. Whenever an event is posted and an agent chooses a task to handle it, the first thing the agent does is to search a plan to handle the event. Dialogue games are not implemented within the agents' program, but as event and plan classes that are external to agents. An agent Ag 1 starts a dialogue game by generating an event and by sending it to the addressee Ag 2 . Ag 2 executes the plan corresponding to the received event and answers by generating another event and sending it to Ag 1 .
In the implemented prototype, agents inherit from the basic class Jack c T M Agent. The argumentation systems are implemented as Java modules using logic programming techniques. These modules use agents' belief sets to build arguments for or against certain propositional formulae. The trust model is implemented using events and plans. The requests sent by an agent about the trust of another agent are events and the evaluations of agents' trust are programmed in plans. The trust graph is implemented as a graph data structure. As Java classes, agents have private data called Belief Data. Fig. 6 illustrates the different data structures used in the prototype (agents' belief data, plans, and events). 
B. Example
In order to evaluate our trust model, we used the developed prototype to run simulations. The purpose was to test how a given agent (Ag 1 in the example) determines if some agents are trustworthy or not by interacting with other agents in his social network. We created 300 agents in the simulated environment, 50 of them are malicious agents and 250 are trustworthy, and the average number of interactions between agents is 140 interactions. In this example, Ag 1 uses Protocol 2 (Section IV-C) to ask other agents in his network about the trustworthiness of 70 agents (the 50 malicious agents and 20 trustworthy agents). We are interested in this example in the number of detected malicious agents. The simulations show that this number increases with the size of the social network, which automatically increases the number of interactions. When the network achieves a given size (70 in the example), the number of detected malicious agents becomes constant and very close to the real number of malicious agents. Fig. 7 depicts these results. 
VI. RELATED WORK
Several Trust model systems have been proposed in recent years. In this section, we will discuss the most important of them: PGP Trust Model [2] , SPORAS [28] , FIRE [14] , ReGreT [20] , Referral Model [24] , [25] , and PRUNES [27] .
PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is an algorithm used to encrypt files and protect them from unauthorized access using public and private keys [29] . Each private key is paired with a public key that is available to anyone. At the level of trust, PGP adopts the web of trust approach [2] . There are no central authority which everybody trusts, but instead, individuals sign each other's keys and progressively build a web of individual public keys interconnected by links formed by these signatures. For example, let us assume that Carol requires some data from Bob whom Carol have never met before. Alice, one of Carols colleagues, signs Bob's public-key certificate which she knows is authentic. Bob then forwards his signed certificate to Carol who wishes to communicate with Bob privately. Carol, who knows and trusts Alice, finds out, after verification, that Alice is among Bob's certificate signer (Bob could have more than one signature on his certificate to make it more widely acceptable). Therefore, Carol can be confident that Bob's public key is authentic. In this case, Carol regards Alice to be an introducer for her. This approach is close to the social network adopted in this paper. However, the PGP trust model is only proposed to trust public keys, and does not explain how introducers are trusted and evaluated. In addition, unlike our model, the PGP trust model does not consider communication protocols between agents and introducers.
Recently, some online trust models have been developed (see [13] for a detailed survey). The most widely used are those on eBay and Amazon Auctions. Both of these are implemented as a centralized trust system so that their users can rate and learn about each other's reputation. For example, on eBay, trust values (or ratings) are +1, 0, or -1 and users, after an interaction, can rate their partners. The ratings are stored centrally and summed up to give an overall rating. Thus, reputation in these models is a global single value. However, the model can be unreliable, particularly when some buyers do not return ratings. In addition, these models are not suitable for applications in open (multi-agent) systems. e.g. for negotiation, because they are too simple in terms of their trust rating values and the way they are aggregated.
Another centralized approach called SPORAS has been proposed in [28] . SPORAS does not store all the trust values, but rather updates the global reputation value of an agent according to his most recent rating. The model uses a learning function for the updating process so that the reputation value can reflect an agent's trust. It introduces a reliability measure based on the standard deviations of the trust values. However, unlike our models, SPORAS deal with all ratings equally without considering the different trust degrees. Consequently, it suffers from rating noise. In addition, like eBay, SPORAS is a centralized approach, so it is not suitable for open systems.
Broadly speaking, there are three main approaches to trust in open multi-agent systems. The first approach is built on an agent's direct experience of an interaction partner. The second approach uses information provided by other agents [24] , [25] , [26] . The third approach uses certified information provided by referees [14] , [23] . In the first approach, methods by which agents can learn and make decisions to deal with trustworthy or untrustworthy agents should be considered. In the models based on the second and the third approaches, agents should be able to reliably acquire and reason about the transmitted information. In the third approach, agents should provide thirdparty referees to witness about their previous performance.
Because the first approaches are only based on a history of interactions, the resulting models are poor because agents with no prior interaction histories could trust dishonest agents until a sufficient number of interactions is built.
Sabater [20] proposes a decentralized trust model called Regret. Unlike the first approach models, Regret uses an evaluation technique not only based on an agent's direct experience of his partners' reliability, but it also uses a witness reputation component. In addition, trust values (called ratings) are dealt with according to their recency relevance. Thus, old ratings are given less importance compared to new ones. However, unlike our model, Regret does not show how witnesses can be located. In addition, this model does not deal with the possibility that an agent may lie about his rating of another agent, and because the ratings are simply equally summed, the technique can be sensitive to noise. In our model, this issue is managed by considering the witnesses' trust and because our merging method takes into account the proportional relevance of each reputation value, rather than treating them equally (see Equation 5 ).
Yu and Singh [24] , [25] , [26] propose an approach called Referral Model based on social networks in which agents, acting as witnesses, can transmit information about each other. The purpose is to tackle the problem of retrieving ratings from a social network through the use of referrals. Referrals are pointers to other sources of information similar to links that a search engine would plough through to obtain a web page. Through referrals, an agent can provide another agent with alternative sources of information about a potential interaction partner. The social network is presented using a referral network called TrustNet. The trust graph we propose in this paper is similar to TrustNet, however there are several differences between our approach and Yu and Singh's approach. Unlike Yu and Singh's approach in which agents do not use any particular reasoning, our approach uses argumentation-based negotiation in which agents use argumentation-based reasoning. In addition, Yu and Singh do not consider the possibility that an agent may lie about his rating of another agent. They assume all witnesses are totally honest. However, this problem of inaccurate reports is considered in our approach by taking into account the trust of all the agents in the trust graph, particularly the witnesses. Also, unlike our model, Yu and Singh's model do not treat the timely relevance information and all ratings are dealt with equally. Consequently, this approach cannot manage the situation where the agents' behavior changes over time.
Huynh, Jennings, and Shadbot [14] propose a model called FIRE in order to tackle the problem of collecting the required information by the evaluator itself to assess the trust of his partner, called the target. The problem is due to the fact that the models based on witness implicitly assume that witnesses are willing to share their experiences. For this reason, they propose an approach, called certified reputation, based not only on direct and indirect experiences, but also on third-party references provided by the target agent itself. The idea is that the target agent can present arguments about his reputation. These arguments are references produced by the agents that have interacted with the target agents certifying his credibility (the model proposed by Maximilien and Singh [16] uses the same idea). This approach has the advantage of quickly producing an assessment of the target's trust because it only needs a small number of interactions and it does not require the construction of a trust graph. However, this approach has some limitations. In particular, because the referees are proposed by the target agent, this agent can provide only referees that will give positive ratings about him and avoid other referees, probably more credible than the provided ones. Moreover, even if the provided agents are credible, their witness could not reflect the real picture of the target's honesty. This approach can privilege opportunistic agents, which are agents only credible with potential referees. In addition, in this approach, the evaluator agent should be able to evaluate the honesty of the referees using a witness-based model. Consequently, a trust graph like the one proposed in this paper could be used. This means that, in some situations, the target's trust might not be assessed without asking for witness agents.
PRUNES (Prudent Negotiation Strategy) [27] introduced a negotiation strategy based on the use of Digital Credentials. It represents a complete automated trust negotiation strategy based on backtracking, which guarantees to find a successful negotiation whenever the credential strategies of the service requester and provider allow. PRUNES ensure that no irrelevant credentials are disclosed in the resulting negotiation. It guarantees that trust is established if allowed by the credential disclosure strategies. In the proposed model, credentials are treated as propositional symbols. It is also assumed that the credential sets of the two negotiation parties are disjoint. A credential disclosure strategy for credential C is defined to be in the form:
C ← F c (S 1 , . . . , S n ) where F c (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is an expression involving only credentials from other parties. S i is satisfied if and only if the other party has shown credential S i . Credential C can be shown to the other party only if F c (S 1 , . . . , S n ) is satisfied. A successful negotiation finds a credential exchange sequence G = L 1 , . . . , L j , S, where each L i is a credential, for 1 ≤ i ≤ j, such that when two parties exchange credentials in the order defined by G, F L i evaluates to true when it is time for L i to be shown to the other party. Note that the requester can get the service S only if the requester proves his qualifications by showing a combination of credentials that satisfies S's access strategy, which can be expressed in the same manner as a credential disclosure strategy. Unlike our proposal, PRUNES does not consider parties as autonomous agents, but just entities exchanging simple messages. Also, the problem in PRUNES is not how to trust entities, but rather how to negotiate trust by exchanging Digital Credentials.
VII. CONCLUSION
The contribution of this paper is the definition and implementation of a new model to secure agent-oriented systems in which agents communicate with each other and reason using advanced decision making techniques. Two communicating protocols and different agent strategies have been presented, as well as several models, of increasing sophistication, for agents to make use of the information communicated to them by other agents they consider trustworthy to determine the trust of further target agents. Our model has the advantage of being computationally efficient and of taking into account four important factors: (1) the trust (from the viewpoint of the evaluator agents) of the trustworthy agents; (2) the trust value assigned to target agents according to the point of view of trustworthy agents; (3) the number of interactions between trustworthy agents and the target agents; and (4) the timely relevance of information transmitted by trustworthy agents. The resulting model allows us to produce a comprehensive assessment of the agents' credibility in a software system.
